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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

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I.

## THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

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### PART I.

THE following paragraphs have formed a part of the "law of the land" for more than eighty-five years, and were recently reënacted in the Revised Statutes of the United States :

"SECTION 1625. Every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years, shall be enrolled in the militia."

"SEC. 1628. Every citizen shall, after notice of his enrollment, be constantly provided with a good musket or firelock, of a bore sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball ; or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch, and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder ; and shall appear so armed, accoutred, and provided, when called out to exercise or into service. . . . Each commissioned officer shall be armed with a sword or hanger and spontoon."

"SEC. 1632. . . . The officers [of cavalry] shall be armed with a sword or hanger, a fusee, bayonet and belt, with a cartridge-box to contain twelve cartridges. . . . Each dragoon shall furnish himself with a serviceable horse, at least fourteen and a half hands high, a

good saddle, bridle, mail-pillion, and valise, holsters, and a breast-plate and crupper," etc.

Few of the younger men of our generation can interpret these provisions without the aid of a dictionary. The powder-horns, flints, fusees, muskets, hangers, spontoons, breastplates, and mail-pillions of our fathers, must be looked for, not in our arsenals, but in the cabinets of antiquaries. The sections of the law quoted above indicate how far modern improvements in the *matériel* of war have carried us since the close of the last century. Military implements, the supply of an army, its organization, tactics, and discipline, have constituted the elements of military science in all ages; but improvement in weapons and accoutrements appears to lead and control all the rest. Each new development in arms must be followed by a corresponding change in organization, discipline, and tactics. It would be interesting to trace the changes through which military science has passed during the last century. We should find, especially during the last half-century, that at the end of each great war some leading implement was mustered out of service, and replaced by a better one; and every such improvement has required a corresponding change in the prevailing methods of warfare. Just now, military inventors are inquiring whether it is easier to produce an irresistible projectile than an impenetrable target. When the problem shall be solved, the armaments of the civilized world must be conformed to the result.

During the great war for the Union, the United States acquired an experience in all branches of military science more rich and varied than in any previous half-century of our history; and many efforts have since been made, both by Congress and students of military science, to embody this experience in the better organization and equipment of our army.

It was the purpose of Congress, in the act of July 28, 1866, "fixing the military peace establishment," to make a permanent organization of the army, and to use, in its formation, the very excellent material which the war had developed. Public opinion, at that time, was almost unanimous that the army should be larger, in proportion to our population and extent of territory, than it was before the war; and the five regiments of artillery, ten regiments of cavalry, and forty-five regiments of infantry, constituting an army of fifty thousand men, authorized by that act, was con-

sidered as small a force as was consistent with the development of military science and the proper defense of the nation. Whether the change of opinion which has since taken place in Congress be founded on sufficient or insufficient grounds, it is not now worth while to inquire. But it should be remembered that at the date of the act fixing the peace establishment, and during several succeeding years, the duties of the national Government were necessarily of a semi-military character. It was a period of transition from war to peace; and the work of reconstruction, as undertaken by Congress, could only be successfully accomplished by the aid of the army. The employment of the army in a service so closely related to political action, produced not a little prejudice against the entire military establishment; and it should be mentioned to the credit of the army that, while the work was distasteful to all its leading officers, they not only performed their duty without a murmur, but bore, with honorable fortitude, the political criticisms which this unsought service brought upon them.

When the seceded States were restored to their normal relations to the Union, and the work of reconstruction was substantially complete, it became evident that the army was larger than the country needed for the ordinary service of peace; and the necessary economy required to reduce the heavy burden of taxation resulting from the war rendered imperative such reduction as was consistent with the public safety. As early as 1868 Congress addressed itself to the work of reconstructing the army on the basis of a smaller organization, and, in so doing, encountered some of the most difficult and delicate questions of statesmanship and military science. Not only in Congress, but also among officers whose experience in the field entitled their opinions to great weight, there was found the widest disparity of views on almost every leading topic of inquiry. Added to the inherent difficulties of the subject was the fact that no considerable reduction could be made without doing great injustice to officers who had abandoned the pursuits of civil life, and had so long devoted themselves to the military profession that they were in a measure unfitted for other avocations.

At every session of Congress since 1868, the question of the strength, organization, and administration of the army, has been examined and discussed with more or less thoroughness. But

legislation on the subject has consisted only of fragmentary acts, temporary makeshifts, in which repeated reductions have been effected in the force of the army, accompanied with the intimation that the work of reorganization was only postponed. By the act of March 3, 1869, all appointments and promotions in the line and staff of the army were stopped until further legislation by Congress, and all enlistments were stopped until the number of infantry regiments should be reduced to twenty-five. This act, together with the act of July 15, 1870, effected a reduction in the number of commissioned officers from 3,036 to 2,277; and the number of enlisted men was reduced by two steps, first from 51,605 to 35,000, and then to 30,000.

The act of June 16, 1874, reduced the number of commissioned officers to 2,161, and the number of enlisted men to 25,000. By the act of August 15, 1876, a temporary increase of 2,500 enlisted in the cavalry regiments was authorized, to meet the necessities of the Sioux War, but they were to be continued only during the Indian hostilities. And, finally, a bill is now pending (February, 1878) in the House of Representatives, which abolishes several of the staff departments, some by actual muster out, and others by consolidation, and musters out ten regiments of infantry, four of cavalry, and two of artillery. It reduces the force of enlisted men to 20,000, and requires the mustering out of 835 commissioned officers, with the provision, however, that, in case the Indian Bureau shall be transferred to the War Department, the President may retain in the service 198 of the proscribed officers of the lowest rank; but 637 commissioned officers will be peremptorily dismissed if the bill becomes a law.

Early in the discussion of the subject the difficulties connected with the proper adjustment of the several staff departments were so great that the expedient was adopted of suspending promotions in the staff altogether until it should be so reduced by the casualties of the service as to make the problem of reorganization more easy of solution. By the act of July 24, 1876, Congress referred the whole subject of reforming and reorganizing the army to a commission, to consist of two members of the Senate, two members of the House of Representatives, and two officers from the army, one from the line and one from the staff corps. Unfortunately, the act required the commission to

report to Congress the results of their deliberations by the 1st day of December following. The commission accumulated much valuable material, but their term of service expired before it was possible to reach satisfactory conclusions; and now the whole subject is again pending in Congress as unsettled as ever. In the mean time the efficiency of the army is seriously impaired by the uncertainty and apprehension which the situation produces; and the continual agitation of the subject by Congress, without reaching any conclusion, is a grievous wrong to the officers. It is the purpose of this article to give the readers of the *REVIEW* an opportunity to know what the army itself thinks upon these questions.

Probably every intelligent citizen recognizes the necessity of maintaining a regular army in time of peace, and for two reasons: 1. To keep alive the knowledge and practice of military science, so that, at any time, in case of foreign or domestic war, the nation may know how to defend itself against the most skillful enemy. A military establishment, sufficient for the attainment of this object, would be necessary, even if we had no present employment whatever for a single soldier. 2. To have constantly at our command an active, disciplined force sufficient to preserve inviolate the national boundaries; to protect our widely-extended frontier against a savage and treacherous race; to protect the public property and preserve the peace in all places subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States; and to aid the several States in case of invasion or insurrection too powerful to be controlled by their local authorities. An army large enough to meet these two requirements will doubtless receive the generous and cordial support of all right-minded citizens. The size, character, and administration of such an army, are the factors of the problem now under discussion before the American people. Before expressing any opinion on the several questions involved in this controversy, we propose to hear what the leaders of military science are thinking in regard to it.

The papers laid before the commission already referred to, but not yet published, are of great value, both on account of the ability with which they were prepared, and the high character and varied experience of their authors.

The paper presented by the General of the Army gives us an

admirable condensation of the history of our army from the birth of the Constitution to the present time, and also his suggestions for the better organization and administration of our present establishment.

Its author has passed through all the grades of the service with distinguished honor. To a career of extraordinary brilliancy and success in the command of great armies in the field, and nine years of experience at the head of the army, since the war, he has added his own personal examination and study of the military establishments of the leading states of Europe.

His patriotism, breadth of views, and fullness of knowledge, entitle his opinions and recommendations to great weight.

We quote his paper entire :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, }  
WASHINGTON, D. C., September, 1876. }

To Hon. J. D. CAMERON, *Secretary of War, and President of the Commission for the Reorganization, etc., of the Army.*

SIR: . . . In compliance with the resolution adopted by the commission at its first session, August, 1876, I have the honor to submit my individual views and opinions of the matters confided to our action.

Preliminary thereto, I have endeavored to select, from the American state papers, military affairs, and from the various reports of the Secretaries of War and committees of Congress, such documents as will show the gradual growth and development of the small army which existed at the time of the inauguration of our present Government in 1789.

From these it will appear that General Washington, in the very first year of his administration, called the attention of Congress to the necessity of maintaining a regular force "to protect the frontiers from the depredations of hostile Indians; to prevent intrusion on the public lands, and to facilitate the surveying and selling of the same for the purpose of reducing the public debt." Subsequently, on January 21, 1790, he submitted a plan of the Secretary of War, General Knox, for the organization of the militia, with his famous report, which has been held as fundamental doctrine in this country ever since.

Yet in his "plan" of organization he seems to have been convinced by the arguments of Maréchal Saxe to adopt the old Roman legion as the "unit or basis," because it was a "little army in itself," composed of all parts, and "prepared to meet every species of war that could present itself."

Under this influence, and authorized by Congress, General Washington, in 1792, organized the then army into the "Legion of the United States," divided into four sub-legions. Each sub-legion contained one troop of dragoons, one company of artillery, four companies of rifles, and eight compa-

nies of infantry, amounting to 1,280 men, and the four sub-legions aggregated 5,120 officers and men.

The *general staff* was: one major-general, or legionary-general, four brigadier-generals, or sub-legionary generals, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one deputy-quartermaster, one surgeon, one chaplain.

*Field-Officers.*—Fourteen majors, fifty-six captains, sixty lieutenants, forty-eight ensigns, and four cornets.

In addition were allowed four surgeons, twelve surgeons' mates, and six surgeons' mates for garrison duty, or extra service.

This organization may be assumed as the foundation on which all subsequent armies have been built.

The experience of a few years, however, seems to have demonstrated that the modern regiment was better adapted to administration than the legion composed of all arms; and we find that by an act of Congress of March 6, 1802, the army was reorganized into a regiment of artillery, two regiments of infantry, a corps of engineers, and a general staff, aggregating 3,356. Many changes followed in quick succession, embracing the period of the war with Great Britain of 1812-'14; and in 1817 we find the army to have consisted of a general staff, corps of engineers, Ordnance Department, a regiment of light artillery, a corps of artillery, eight regiments of infantry, and one of rifles, aggregating 8,221 men.

Then, as now, the country was staggering under the effect of a large debt, incurred in the then recent war, which called for a reduction of the expenses of the General Government. Under a resolution of the House of Representatives, of April 17, 1818, the Hon. John C. Calhoun, then Secretary of War, submitted a special report on the subject of army organization and administration; and subsequently, on January 12, 1820, another on the same general subject, which reports seems to me so exhaustive, and so applicable to the present occasion, that nothing more need be written, further than to apply his principles and reasoning to the new state of facts.

He assumes as axioms:

"That the army, in organization and numbers, should have reference to the *objects* for which it is maintained. The objects for which a standing army in peace ought to be maintained, may be comprised under two classes: 1. Those which, though they have reference to a state of war, yet are more immediately connected with its duties in peace; and, 2. Those which relate immediately and solely to war. Under the first class may be enumerated as the leading objects, the garrisoning of our forts along the Atlantic frontier in order to preserve them, and to cause the sovereignty of the United States to be respected in their immediate neighborhood; and the occupying of certain commanding posts in our inland frontiers to keep in check our savage neighbors, and to protect our newly-formed and feeble settlements in that quarter. These are, doubtless, important objects, but are by no means so essential as those which relate solely to a state of war. . . .

"The great and leading objects, then, of a military establishment in peace, ought to be to create and perpetuate military skill and experience, so that at



all times the country may have at its command a body of officers sufficiently numerous and well-instructed in every branch of duty, both of the line and of the staff; and the organization of the army ought to be such as to enable the Government, at the commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular force adequate to the emergencies of the country, properly organized and prepared for actual service. . . .

"To give such an organization, the leading principles in its formation ought to be, that at the commencement of hostilities there should be nothing either to new-model or to create. The only difference, consequently, between the peace and the war formation of the army ought to be in the increased magnitude of the latter; and the only change in passing from the former to the latter should consist in giving to it the augmentation which will then be necessary.

"It is thus, and thus only, the dangerous transition from peace to war may be made without confusion or disorder; and the weakness and danger which otherwise would be inevitable be avoided. Two consequences result from this principle: 1. The organization of the staff in a peace establishment ought to be such that every branch of it should be completely formed, with such extension as the number of troops and posts occupied may render necessary; and, 2. That the organization of the line ought, as far as practicable, to be such that, in passing from peace to the war formation, the force may be sufficiently augmented without adding new regiments and battalions; thus raising the war on the peace establishment, instead of incurring a new army to be added to the old, as at the commencement of the late war (1812). The next principle to be observed is, that the organization ought to be such as to induce, in time of peace, citizens of adequate talents and respectability of character to enter and remain in the military service of the country, so that the Government may have officers at its command, who to the requisite experience would add the public confidence. The correctness of this principle can scarcely be doubted, for surely if it is worth having an army at all, it is worth having it well commanded."

Since the date of that report the country has had the experience of three great wars, and innumerable conflicts with the Indians, yet the principles enunciated are the same to-day as in 1820. The various changes of organization and of the strength of parts are better illustrated by the documents and tables herewith, than by any written statement I might attempt, but it is seen clearly that the present organization and strength of the army result logically from antecedent events; and that measured by any standard—of the population of the country, its wealth, the extent of territory, the number of posts to be maintained, the routes of travel to be guarded, the public lands, from which trespassers are to be excluded, or indeed by any fair inference of necessity—it can be demonstrated that the existing military establishment, including all officers and enlisted men, aggregating 27,489, is less in proportion than was the Legion of the United States, fixed by General Washington in 1792.

Therefore, it would seem to be the part of wisdom to let well enough



alone, and to allow the existing army to increase or diminish by natural causes, according to the necessities of the country.

But on the supposition that the present commission prefer to accomplish a thorough reorganization, I have prepared the accompanying table, exhibiting an organization easily reached from the present standard, and which would better fulfill the second of Mr. Calhoun's principles of being enlarged to a war standard with the least possible "confusion or disorder," and "at the least possible expense."

It will be observed that I assume the new force, or peace establishment, to consist of five regiments of artillery, ten of cavalry, and twenty of infantry; each to have the same identical organization, leaving to the artillery and cavalry the same number of companies as now, and diminishing the number of infantry regiments by five, but adding two companies to each regiment, thus only disbanding ten of the existing companies. I take from the artillery and cavalry fifteen majors, and give twenty to the infantry, an increase of five; and give to each company of cavalry and infantry two first-lieutenants, the same that the artillery now have. This will increase the number of first lieutenants in the army by three hundred and sixty, a most valuable increase, because they are the active "duty-officers," and they constitute the school from which the country will, in times of war and danger, habitually draw the chief officers for hard service.

Examining the table further, we find that each regiment, of every arm of service, is composed of twelve companies, susceptible of being grouped into three battalions of four companies each, to command and administer which are—

One colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors (one field-officer to command each battalion); one adjutant, and one quartermaster and commissary—making six officers; and —

One sergeant-major, one quartermaster-sergeant, one commissary sergeant, and one principal musician—making four non-commissioned staff.

Each company will have one captain, two first-lieutenants, and one second-lieutenant—making four officers; one orderly sergeant, three sergeants, three corporals, two artificers, two musicians, and fifty privates—making four officers and sixty-one enlisted men.

Each regiment would then contain, for a *peace establishment*, fifty-four officers and seven hundred and thirty-six enlisted men—aggregating seven hundred and ninety; or the

5 regiments of artillery = 60 companies = 270 officers, and 3,680 men.							
10	"	cavalry	120	"	540	"	7,360 "
20	"	infantry	240	"	1,080	"	14,720 "
					<hr/>		
					1,890		<hr/>
							25,760

Aggregating officers and men, 27,650.

To increase to the *war standard*, simply add to each company one sergeant, one corporal, and fifty privates, which would result as follows:

5 regiments of artillery = 60 companies = 270 officers, and 6,800 men.						
10	"	cavalry	120	"	540	" 13,600 "
20	"	infantry	240	"	1,080	" 27,200 "
					<hr/>	
					1,890	<hr/>
						47,600

To further increase for war purposes, add four new companies to each battalion, and we have—

5 regiments of artillery = 120 companies = 510 officers, and 13,700 men.								
10	"	cavalry	240	"	1,020	"	27,400	"
20	"	infantry	480	"	2,040	"	54,800	"
					<hr/>			
					3,570		<hr/>	
							95,900	

The Germans now use companies as large as two hundred and fifty men, so that a battalion of eight companies numbers two thousand men. Assuming that as the *maximum*, we will have—

5	regiments	=	15	battalions of artillery	=	30,000
10	"		30	"	cavalry,	60,000
20	"		60	"	infantry,	120,000

Making an army of						<hr/>	210,000
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on a *minimum*, or peace basis, of 27,650. Thus an effective and well-organized army, of over 200,000, can be created promptly, "without the least confusion or disorder," fulfilling all the conditions of Mr. Calhoun's second great principle, which he regarded as of more national importance than the first.

On considering any paper organization, it is safe to assume that about one-third are usually absent. This seems a large proportion, but it is the result of experience extending back for centuries. Good discipline and good administration diminish this ratio; while bad discipline and worse administration increase it largely. The usual causes of diminished ranks are, wounds and sickness; furloughs and leaves of absence; confinement, by way of punishment; details for cooking; for care of sick; as teamsters; care and distribution of supplies; detachments for escorts of trains and exposed points along the routes of supply, etc. These causes are common to all armies in peace and in war; besides which our peace establishment is specially subject to causes which take officers away from their legitimate regiments and companies. It is a very common popular error that an army is necessarily idle in time of peace; and, for this alleged reason, influential families strive to draw their sons and friends away from their duty. No army in war performs more real hard work than does our American peace establishment, building forts and posts along our ever-changing frontier; building roads hundreds and thousands of miles in extent; guarding trains, and in explorations, which cause them to march thousands of miles in a single season, etc. Among these special *causes*, I will enumerate the following: The Military Academy at all times draws from the regiments thirty officers; the civil universities are entitled to thirty by law; the recruiting service requires forty;

besides which are courts-martial, boards of survey, boards to examine new inventions in arms, accoutrements, clothing, and equipments; "Centennial Boards," etc. At this very time there are three hundred and thirty-five officers so absent from their proper companies, besides many more who have leave of absence from their division and department commanders. I am satisfied that discipline and good economy demand that there never should be less than two, and habitually not less than three, officers present with each organized company; and it is for this reason that I have added one first-lieutenant to each company of cavalry and infantry, the same as now exists in the artillery companies.

The *company* is the foundation of all good armies. It is here the officers and soldiers learn guard-duty, picket-duty, the drill, the mode of cooking, the manner of sleeping in barracks or in the field, the indispensable habit of subordination and obedience; how to preserve the health and strength of the men; how to care for the sick and wounded; the muster, embracing the history of individuals, on which are based all claims for pensions, bounties, and provision in old age and infirmity.

Four such companies united form the *battalion*, with a field-officer to command, which is a splendid unit for peace or for war; and the value of this organization is, that, in the ever-varying phases which military duty assumes in our country, two of these battalions may be easily strengthened by the transfer of all the effective officers and privates of the third battalion to the other two, thus constituting an effective force of eight companies, each of which will have about seventy-five privates, eleven non-commissioned officers, and four officers, while the reduced battalion would remain at some depot, constituting a sufficient guard, and be useful in collecting a reserve force of recruits.

The *three* battalions habitually compose the *regiment*, which is the most perfect organization, common to all civilized arms, where administration and discipline are united under the colonel, an officer of experience, who should be qualified for every manner of duty—field and staff—in peace or war; and who would be ready for the most parsimonious administration, or for an enlargement of his command to the equivalent of an ordinary division.

Having thus disposed of the army proper, I will now pass to the subjects of "generals" and of "general staff," which have given rise to so much controversy.

According to existing laws, there are in the military establishment to-day—

One general, one lieutenant-general, three major-generals, six brigadier-generals.

These are all now employed on duties commensurate with their rank, yet there are employed two other officers of the grade of colonel, who command departments, viz.: Colonel Ruger, Department of the South, and Colonel Kautz, who commands the Department of Arizona. Should vacancies occur in the grades of general and lieutenant-general, they could not be filled, and the command of the army would devolve on the senior major-general. In

my judgment this law should be modified so as to leave the rank of lieutenant-general permanent; for all the world over 25,000 men are held to be the equivalent of a corps d'armée, the legitimate command of a lieutenant-general, and the title alone will be an incentive to honorable conduct and competition among the general officers of the army.

In discussing the general staff, I will treat of the several parts, with the titles by which they are at present known, following the classification of the *Army Register* of 1876. Aides-de-camp and military secretary are *personal* staff, selected by each general officer, from officers in the regiments or staff, without increasing the general aggregate. They simply receive additional rank and pay while so acting, which rank and pay have been sanctioned by long experience, and are necessary, by reason of their increased expense while following the fortunes of their chiefs.

I recommend that no change be made in existing laws, but, if reduction is inevitable, then that the general have four aides, that the lieutenant-general have three aides, instead of two aides and one secretary, thus avoiding a title which is in fact obsolete; that major-generals have two, and brigadier-generals one each—in all nineteen.

The *Adjutant-General's Department* consists of one brigadier-general, two colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, and ten majors, seventeen in all—a number which is not deemed excessive; nor do the rank and pay exceed their necessities.

The *Inspector-General's Department* consists of three colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, and two majors, certainly as low in numbers and rank as the most rigid economy could demand. I advise that the senior colonel be made a brigadier-general, on a par with the other heads of departments.

The *Bureau of Military Justice* consists of one brigadier-general and four majors, which also seems as small as possible.

The *Quartermaster's Department* has one brigadier-general, four colonels, eight lieutenant-colonels, fourteen majors, and thirty captains—fifty-seven in all. When we contemplate the extent of our country, the scattered condition of the troops, and the important functions performed by this branch of the staff, I surely see no good reason for further reduction.

The *Subsistence Department* consists of one brigadier-general, two colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, eight majors, and twelve captains—twenty-six in all. To fulfill their proper duties there is now, and will likely continue to be, plenty of work for this number of officers.

The *Medical Department* now consists of one brigadier-general, two colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, fifty majors, ninety-two captains, and fifty-eight first lieutenants; also, four store-keepers and seventy-nine hospital stewards—in all two hundred and nine officers and seventy-nine enlisted men. The rank of these officers is assimilated for the purpose of pay and quarters, and their functions are so professional that I dislike to venture the expression of an opinion as to their number or rank; but the Medical Department does seem too large, and I have always preferred that each regiment

should have one surgeon and two assistants, leaving a small number as a general staff for assignment to divisions and departments.

The *Pay Department* consists of one brigadier-general, two colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, and fifty majors; in all, fifty-five.

By existing laws, every regiment, company, and detachment of the army, must be mustered and paid every two months. When we contemplate the necessarily scattered condition of the army, I do not see how a less number can, by the utmost activity, succeed in fulfilling this task.

The *Signal Department* consists of one brigadier-general; and the officers necessary for the execution of the duties devolving on this department are detailed from the line of the army, at present eighteen. These duties are more civil than military; and I confess that I would prefer that they should be devolved on some civil branch of the Government, such as the Coast Survey.

*Chaplains.*—Of these the law provides for thirty post chaplains, and four regimental chaplains; the latter provided specially for the regiments of colored troops. I have no hesitation in advising that chaplains, as an army rank, should be abolished. It is notorious that these chaplains are not serving at the remote posts, for which they were specially provided. It would be preferable that, in place of commissioning the chaplains as army captains, that the Secretary of War be authorized to designate fifty of the military posts as chaplain posts; that the council of administration at each of said posts be authorized to select and employ a chaplain, who shall receive, while performing the duties, one hundred dollars a month. The aggregate cost of fifty thus selected would not exceed that of the present thirty-four. In this connection I will also say that I believe the time has come when the words "white" and "black" should be omitted in all military laws; that recruits should be enlisted and distributed to all companies and regiments without reference to color or previous condition. Time would soon, in the army as it already has in the navy, obliterate the old prejudice that led to the formation of the regiments of colored cavalry and infantry. All should be alike.

There still remain the *Corps of Engineers*, consisting of one brigadier-general, six colonels, twelve lieutenant-colonels, twenty-four majors, thirty captains, twenty-six first-lieutenants, ten second-lieutenants, thirty-eight non-commissioned officers, eight musicians, one hundred and fifty-four privates: in all, one hundred and nine officers, and two hundred enlisted men.

The enlisted men of engineers are now organized into three companies, two of which are at Willett's Point, New York, under Major H. L. Abbot, a most thorough and competent officer, as a school of instruction in pontooning, torpedoes, and in modern galvanic appliances; the other company is at West Point. So far as the army is concerned, these companies are not available to the general commanding the department in which they are stationed, and are held as only subject to the orders of the President. In like manner the officers, with few exceptions, are not subject to army inspection and association, being employed in the construction of military and civil works.

I have the most unqualified respect for the superior qualifications and attainments of the officers of this corps, always selected from the highest graduates of the Military Academy, and only regret their isolation from the army proper. I am satisfied that both parts would be benefited by a closer alliance, but in this connection will only recommend that, in the estimates for the maintenance of the military establishment, the pay, allowances, transportation and incidental expenses of the army, the Engineer Corps be made distinct, so that Congress may see at a glance the cost of this corps, when compared with the infantry, cavalry, etc. Instead of *three* companies, I suggest a battalion of four companies of the exact standard of the other arms of service.

The *Ordnance Department* consists of one brigadier-general, three colonels, four lieutenant-colonels, ten majors, twenty captains, sixteen first-lieutenants, one hundred and twenty non-commissioned officers, and two hundred and eighty men—in all fifty-four officers and four hundred men. The officers and men of this corps also are so separated from the army proper, that both are the losers thereby. The arsenals are not subject to the supervision or inspection of the generals commanding divisions or departments, so that the isolation is perfect. In years past the policy of the Government was to distribute the ordnance-stores to arsenals in almost every State, but now that railways admit of the prompt distribution of such stores, the tendency is to contraction, so as ultimately to have but four great arsenals—one on the Atlantic (Springfield, Massachusetts), one on the Pacific (Benicia, California), and the third at Rock Island, Illinois; the fourth, to be chiefly a powder-depot, has been wisely recommended by the present chief of ordnance, General Benét, to be located near New York City. All the other arsenals could be dispensed with, sold or converted to some other public use. This would require an act of Congress authorizing the construction of the powder-depot near New York and the sale of the surplus arsenals, most of which are in fact mere “magazines.” Certain of these magazines, located at military centres, should be held, subject to the supervision and control of the commanding generals of the departments wherein they happen to be. To dignify them by the title of arsenal is a misnomer. They are, and should be, *magazines* in charge of an ordnance sergeant and a commissioned officer of ordnance, who should be a staff officer to the department or division commander. If thus modified, I advise the retention of those at Fort Columbus, Fort Monroe, Leavenworth, San Antonio, Texas, Augusta, Georgia, and Vancouver, Washington Territory, and all others to be sold, and proceeds applied to the four main arsenals. The manufacture and preparation of ordnance-stores should be, as now, in charge of this department, under the immediate and sole control of the Secretary of War; but the magazines could be guarded by the department commander, and the stores therefrom issued under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe. This would reduce materially the force and expenses of this department, make it far more efficient, and bring it into closer harmony with the rest of the army.

I advise that this *department* be styled a *corps*, the same as the engineers, and that it have four companies of enlisted men, of the same strength as



other companies of the army, these companies to be officered by the corps. This would give one company to each of the four great arsenals proposed.

There remains a subject which has been discussed in the Military Committee, one of a somewhat delicate nature, that must be met sooner or later. I refer to marriage in the army.

No married man is permitted to be enlisted, but there are allowed to each company four laundresses, or one to every fifteen men, who are supposed to wash the clothes of the men for pay. These laundresses are entitled to a ration per day, and are always provided quarters apart from the men. Taking twenty-five thousand men as the standard, gives sixteen hundred and fifty women, which at twenty-five cents a day, the estimated cost of a ration at the points of consumption, makes \$150,562.50. It is impossible to estimate the incidental cost to the army estimates for laundresses' quarters, for fuel, and for transportation on a change of station, but I have no doubt the entire cost exceeds \$300,000. If marriage in the army is proper and right, all who choose should be permitted to marry, but this is the *reductio ad absurdum*; and I conclude it should be universally prohibited to enlisted men attached to regiments, and that captains of companies should provide for the washing of their men as they now do for the cooking.

In like manner, and for similar reasons, I think marriage should be denied to the lowest grade of officers, viz., to second-lieutenants. Too many of these now marry, and crowd the barracks and quarters which are insufficient, especially at new posts on the frontiers. Though the Government is supposed to have nothing to do with the consequences of such early marriages, yet in practice much cost is entailed in the way of extra quarters, transportation, etc.

No cadet is now permitted to marry, and, for the same reason, second-lieutenants should be assigned to regiments for probation, and be prohibited to marry till they are promoted to the next grade of first-lieutenant.

Though the estimates might not show any saving, still I am satisfied the actual result would equal the cost to the United States of the small number of surplus men (seven hundred and sixty) to keep up the twenty-five thousand men which experience has shown to be needed to make up the permanent peace establishment.

In future appointments to the grade of second-lieutenant, I would advise that such appointments be restricted by law to—

1. Graduates of the United States Military Academy.
2. To graduates of the civil universities at which army-officers are detailed as professors, under sections 1225 and 1260, Revised Statutes, not to exceed one to each college per annum, on the approval of the Faculty and of the officer of the army detailed as professor.

3. Meritorious non-commissioned officers, not over twenty-five years age, recommended by their commanding officers, and approved by the Board of Examiners under existing army regulations.

This would give average candidates per annum:

Military Academy.....	50
Civil colleges.....	30
Regimental candidates.....	35
Total candidates.....	115

This number will probably exceed the average vacancies, and enable the President to appoint to commissions the most worthy. The rule and practice will add greatly to the influence of military education in the civil universities now so popular, and will encourage a class of worthy young men to enlist in the army, with a reasonable prospect of securing a commission by good conduct.

Again I would, in regiments "in the field," or "subjected to epidemic," limit promotion to those actually *present* with the regiment, because it is not fair that the absent should profit by their own exemption from the very cause that creates promotion. And, furthermore, no officer should be promoted from one grade to a higher grade without a previous examination, if the commanding officer, or any three officers of the regiment to which the promotion is to be made, represent to the adjutant-general of the army their belief that the officer entitled to the vacancy by the ordinary law of seniority is incapacitated for such new commission from any cause whatsoever.

All of which is most respectfully submitted as preliminary. Transmitted to the Recorder in order that it may be printed, "in confidence, for the use of the commission."

With great respect, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

W. T. SHERMAN,

*General.*

The letter of General Hancock, commander of the Military Division of the Atlantic, is very full in reference to the required strength of the army in time of peace, and to the details of organization and administration. His long service on the staff, before the war, his honorable and distinguished service as a corps commander during the war, and his important commands of troops in the South, West, and East, since the war, have made him thoroughly acquainted with the practical wants of the army, and its defects of organization.

We quote the principal parts of his letter :

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC, {  
NEW YORK CITY, October 19, 1876. }

To the Hon. J. D. CAMERON, *Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

SIR: . . . What the strength, composition, and organization of the army should be, depends on the purpose for which it is maintained.

A *large* standing army is against the settled policy of the nation. We rely upon creating armies from our population, when the necessity for them has actually arisen, or is impending. But, "in peace prepare for war," is an accepted and respected maxim among us. Under the operations of these

somewhat contradictory principles, we have been led to the compromise of a small standing army, which is expected to keep pace with the progress of the profession, construct adequate and suitable national defenses, hold some of our most important military positions, preventing their sudden seizure by an enemy, his occupation of our harbors, and destruction of our great commercial cities; be prepared at all times to supply the national forces with the most approved weapons, implements, and munitions of war; and to guard these and other public property until distributed for service; be ready at a moment's notice to organize, equip, and supply, with efficiency and economy, armies of any magnitude which the occasion may call for; and, lastly, to serve as a nucleus for the raw levies raised as needed. . . .

What, then, should be the strength, composition, and organization of the army, that it may best accomplish the objects of its existence?

Looking from the standpoint assumed, the first question which presents itself is the question of cost. What, during peace, are the people able and willing to pay in the way of insurance by military proficiency and preparation against heavy loss in case of war? If *nothing*, then the army as a permanent institution ought to be dispensed with. A discussion of the questions arising from our Indian frontier is omitted in this connection. The Indian furnishes only incidental duty for part of the army. The service is of secondary importance, and is comparatively temporary in its nature. It must for a few years longer occupy the attention of our cavalry and infantry, and some parts of the staff, and from time to time influence the strength and organization of these arms, but is entitled to no weight in considering the question just proposed.

If the people are willing in peace, as they have always shown themselves to be, to guarantee their own protection in case of war, by intrusting to an army the accomplishment of the objects hereinbefore enumerated, then the main question is closed, and the resulting ones of the strength, etc., of the force to be kept up are opened.

#### INFANTRY AND CAVALRY.

As a general proposition, it may be said that every arm of the service, in order that it may be a model for the national forces, ought to be large enough to give full development, at whatever cost of time and money, to its own speciality.

In discussing the condition of the infantry and cavalry, General Hancock calls attention to the fact that the number of enlisted men in each company had become too small for effective discipline and instruction, so that in late years it has not been practicable to carry military instruction beyond the school of the individual soldier, or rarely beyond the school of the company. To remedy this evil he recommends that the companies in these arms of the service be filled up to one hundred men each, and

to prevent the aggregate increase of the army which this would occasion, he recommends that the number of companies in each regiment be reduced to eight.

The General then continues :

The question of any further reduction of these arms than that just suggested, should, I think, be deferred a few years longer, until our Indian frontiers are in a more settled condition. If no other disturbances have arisen, I have no doubt that these arms could, with safety, be still further reduced, if then deemed advisable.

#### THE ARTILLERY.

. . . . In the organization of an army for active service sixty batteries of artillery would certainly be an extravagant supply of that arm for twenty-five regiments of infantry, but it must be borne in mind that the different branches of our military peace establishment are not constituted to form due proportions of an active army.

The relative strength of the different parts of our standing army cannot be governed either by the principles of organization for large armies in the field, established by our own experience, or by the principles developed by the more matured experience of foreign nations. On the contrary, in relation to their strength, the different branches of our peace establishment are quite independent of each other, each being intended, not for a proportional integral of our twenty-five thousand men, but to supply a recognized want of our nation.

Artillery, if not the most, is one of the most important, abstruse, and progressive branches of military science. Much time, practice, favorable opportunity, and hard study, are absolutely necessary to master and keep pace with it. *Very* expensive under the most skillful, in untrained hands it becomes *enormously* so. This is true of the heavy as well as of the light artillery. Every shot, for example, from the 15-inch guns of one of our forts costs, for powder and projectile alone, \$63.78, to say nothing of the original cost of the gun, the carriage, implements, etc. The Government only, and not States or individuals, as in the case of cavalry or infantry, can take care of this branch of the military profession. If not protected and fostered by the General Government, it is lost.

Proceeding, as we do, upon the possibility of war, it would certainly be unwise, if not foolish, to build defenses, cast cannon, devise projectiles, and then neglect in peace to teach those things in relation to the use of them which it will be *too late* to learn after war begins. Without multiplying arguments, I may state my conclusion that our true policy is to maintain a comparatively large force of artillery, and keep it well instructed in its specialty. That arm is now too large; perhaps in rank and file not large enough. If the number of enlisted men cannot be increased, and probably it ought not to be at this time, then certainly the men should be concentrated into fewer companies, so that each company shall contain a hundred. Instruction in artillery is seriously retarded under the present system. . . .

A considerable saving of expense would result from the reductions and consolidations proposed in the cavalry, artillery, and infantry. The concentration of enlisted men, so as to have fewer and larger companies, would be a departure from the old theory that our army in peace, especially the line, should be a skeleton, to be filled out for war. This theory, false in principle, has always failed in practice. It involves just that lack of power so much complained of during peace—companies too small for instruction, drill, and other duty—and when war comes, in lieu of filling out the skeleton, we take entire new organizations from the volunteers or militia. Our standing army should be a small, complete, compact, vigorous, healthy body; always in a thorough state of discipline and instruction; serving as a model and a standard for the national forces, and not preserved as a skeleton, into which it is expected to infuse vitality, activity, and knowledge, at the moment an emergency arises.

#### THE ENGINEER CORPS.

This branch of the service is of special importance in time of peace. Speaking generally, its military duties consist mainly in the preparation of permanent defenses. It has, especially with us, *comparatively* little to do in the theatres of offensive modern warfare. In our great war of the rebellion, but very few of the higher officers of the Engineer Corps were on duty as *engineers*. In late years a new feature in the system of river and harbor defenses, by means of torpedoes, has grown up, and promises to be very important. Its successful development requires careful application of the higher sciences. It is at present intrusted to the engineers, and must be regarded as an addition to the duties heretofore required of that corps, although it would ultimately, in case of war, fall into the hands of the artillery. Our extended sea-coast, on two fronts of a continent, with innumerable harbors and great cities exposed, renders a well-matured system of military defenses of vast importance to us. The Engineer Corps should be large enough to execute efficiently the purposes of the Government in relation to these defenses, and to perform, in addition, such subordinate military duties as properly belong to it. The strength which the corps should have for its military duties is, like the artillery, quite independent of the strength of any other arm of service, or of all of them combined. If their duties required it, and their services justified it, the corps might even be largely increased in both the numbers and rank of its officers without any just criticism from the rest of the army. The corps is designed for the performance of important duties to the nation, and not as an adjunct to the standing army, and it has become a rule to intrust its officers with a variety of civil as well as military duties, such, for example, as the improvement of rivers and harbors, and the construction of lighthouses and public buildings. As far as I am able to judge from the limited information I possess, the corps is not larger than it ought to be for the performance of the duties required of it. I credit it with high scientific attainments, with industrious and faithful performance of duty, and with scrupulous honesty in the disbursement of public funds; yet it seems to me that there is a large proportion of high grades in the corps. . . .

## THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

So far as I have the means of judging, the Ordnance Department, like the Engineer Corps, is not too large, but I see no sufficient reason for the great proportion of high grades authorized in it. In my judgment, however, the most important point concerning this corps is its management, not its organization. I have already alluded to the immediate and vital interest which other branches of the service have in the success of its operations. There is nothing so important to the combatant arms of service, and to the general officers who command them, as the arms and ammunition with which the troops are supplied. All of the branches of the service should, as far as possible, add their information and experience in the use of arms to that of the Ordnance Department, for the production of the best arms, ammunition, and equipments; but, instead of this, our Ordnance Department is practically a close corporation, and all officers, from the general-in-chief down, are not only excluded from control in it, but from its councils. To the men who make the arms, etc., is intrusted the solution of all questions in relation to them, the men who use them being excluded from these deliberations. The oft-repeated efforts to consolidate the ordnance and artillery is attributable mainly to the practice just mentioned. . . .

No consolidation is required to effect the object here suggested. It is only necessary that the isolation and independence of this department, in whose labors all of the army is specially interested, shall cease, and that it be brought under the control of the general-in-chief.

The absurdity, if I may be permitted to use the word, of completely isolating interests in our service which are naturally dependent on each other, cannot be better shown than by considering three of the branches of the service already discussed in this letter, viz., the Engineers, Ordnance, and Artillery. The first constructs the national defenses, including the beds for the gun-carriages, the second manufactures all the guns and their carriages, and supplies the ammunition; and the third uses what the other two make. Yet the three act not only independently of each other, but without a common military superior. . . .

## THE QUARTERMASTER'S, SUBSISTENCE, AND PAY DEPARTMENTS.

These are essentially the supply departments of the army. I do not see why any one of them should ever be larger than necessary to fill the demand made on it by the army actually in service. Regulated by this rule in time of peace, I have no doubt that each would, in the future as it has in the past, be found a complete and sufficiently large nucleus on which to build in case of war. In my judgment, the Subsistence and Pay Departments are now, in their strength and organization, well suited to the wants of the army. The bar to promotion in the Pay Department established by the act of March 3, 1869, still exists, although removed in all of the other corps to which it originally applied. I see no reason for this exception, and think that the good of the service, as well as justice to the few officers concerned, demands that it should be removed.

I do not under-estimate the importance, the difficulty, and the variety of the duties of the Quartermaster's Department. Yet I cannot but think that this branch of the service is larger than necessary, especially in the higher grades. The legal organization is, one brigadier-general, four colonels, eight lieutenant-colonels, fourteen majors, and thirty captains. There is nothing in the absolute or relative importance of these positions or duties requiring so large a proportion of offices in the higher grades. In fact, I think it possible that the efficiency of the department is impaired rather than promoted by it. . . .

After quoting a portion of his testimony before the military committee of the House, against the proposed consolidation of the Quartermaster's and Subsistence Departments, General Hancock says :

I adhere to that opinion. The subject is one that has been pretty fully discussed through inquiries made of the most prominent officers of the army by committees of Congress. In 1869, four officers, or ex-officers, expressed themselves in favor of it. In 1874, fifteen were in favor of it, and thirty-four against it. In 1876, twenty were in favor of it, and thirty-five against it. (In all cases, as the matter was presented to me, but especially in the last case, the form of inquiry was as to the *practicability* rather than advisability of the consolidation.) Of the number (twenty) mentioned as in favor, a part merely answered the question of *practicability*. Officers of rank, distinction, and acknowledged ability, are found on both sides in the opinions given in the years above named. A careful examination of all the views expressed will not only show that the weight of evidence has been against the consolidation of these corps, but that the opposition to it has decidedly increased ; and that, while some, who at first favored it, now either oppose or do not support it, there are no changes of opinion in the other direction. . . .

I understand that the supply-branches of the British army have recently undergone consolidation of some kind, but the experiment has been but partially tested in peace, and has not yet been subjected to that trial in a great war which would enable us to judge of its success. . . .

#### THE BUREAU OF MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE CORPS OF JUDGE-ADVOCATES.

After expressing the opinion that the number of judge-advocates is too small, and that the grades of colonel and lieutenant-colonel should be introduced into the corps, General Hancock says :

The duties of judge-advocates are inseparable from the military system. They can only be fully and properly performed by men who make a specialty of them. If the regular corps be abolished or crippled, the duty must be indifferently done, wholly or partly by officers taken for the time from their proper positions. It is a fact worthy of special consideration that this corps constitutes the only element in our whole system of military jurisprudence

which, not being created for temporary and special purposes, has the character of permanency. In the civil system, changeable juries simply find the facts; but judges, both eminent and permanent in the profession, determine questions of law, and award sentences. In the military system, courts are convened from time to time, composed of officers who act both as judges and jurors, but none of whom are, in general, selected with any reference to their knowledge of the judicial duties they are called upon to perform. In these courts the vote, for both findings and sentence, of the most ignorant in the law is as weighty as that of the most learned. In fact the junior, presumably the most uninformed, is required to vote first, in order that he may not be influenced by his seniors.

Is it wise to destroy or weaken, in these tribunals, their only element of stability?

Inasmuch as the military is a more arbitrary and despotic system than the civil, so is uniform and even-handed justice the more necessary in it. But we are far from securing this under our code, even with our judge-advocates. Without an efficient corps of them, we shall be still further from it. It is no uncommon thing to see soldiers, as prisoners in charge of the same guard, for identically the same offense, one under sentence of twice, or even thrice, the severity of another. They have been tried by different courts-martial, each using its discretion as to the amount of punishment for the common offense. Judge-advocates have not the power to *prevent* this evil by awarding sentences or otherwise, but, so far as their limited number permits, they mitigate it. I am not well informed as to the duties of the head of the bureau in Washington, but my own extended observation and experience justify me in speaking quite positively of the importance of judge-advocates at department headquarters. Without going into the details of the various duties required of them, I will say that I consider them absolutely necessary. But the necessity for maintaining these officers does not rest alone on the importance of their current duties. A thorough knowledge of military law in its higher principles, as well as the intricacies of its details, is particularly necessary in new armies. Its prompt and correct application is one of the principal proceedings in the establishment of discipline and order in the armies which we rely upon creating in time of need. This can only be accomplished through a corps prepared beforehand. Ours is peculiarly a government of law in the army as well as out of it. . . .

In these remarks I have given prominence to the duties of judge-advocates in connection with courts-martial. But there are various other matters upon which I need not dwell, such as the questions arising out of the relations of military affairs to the civil service, in which their knowledge and experience are of great value to the public service, to commanding generals, and to subordinate officers.

These are some of the general considerations which lead me to the conviction that a "judge-advocate's department" is an important and necessary feature of our military establishment, whether the regular army be large or small. . . .



## INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

. . . . This corps should be kept large enough to answer the demands of our peace establishment, covering, as it does, a vast territory, and should be ever in readiness for its most essential duty of mustering, organizing, and otherwise preparing new levies for service in time of war. It should, I think, consist of eight or ten members. . . .

## RECRUITMENT.

. . . . Patriotism produces no recruits for the regular army. On the contrary, it holds the citizen to his civil pursuits in time of peace, and hurries him into a volunteer organization in time of war. There is no *public* sentiment to be relied upon for filling the ranks of the permanent force, and hence the recruiting bureau can appeal only to the wishes, tastes, and necessities, of individuals. Thus the ranks of the army are made to contain men of many nationalities, and no regard is paid to citizenship. Under these circumstances all that can reasonably be expected of the recruiting bureau is to obtain men whose mental, moral, and physical qualities are such that they may become *soldiers* by a proper course of discipline and instruction. . . .

The principal objection I see to the recruiting system is, that the bureau is not confined to its legitimate functions. Its duty should, in my judgment, end as soon as it has put the recruit into the military service, and delivered him at a post or depot designated to receive him. But, instead of this, the bureau retains control of the recruit while he is at the depot. To effect this, the officer in charge of the bureau (the adjutant-general) is permitted to depart from his proper sphere of staff duty, and exercise an actual *command*, which, in my opinion, is not justified, either by his office, the wants of the recruiting bureau, or the good of the service at large. There are three or four depots of the same general character. The one nearest me—Fort Columbus—is one of the most conspicuous military stations in New York Harbor—a permanent work armed with heavy guns, at present garrisoned by a larger number of men than any other post in the bay, and sheltering an immense amount of military material. It is withdrawn from the general rules governing command in the service, and with all the other so-called depots is placed under the command of the officer in charge of the recruitment of the army, who, by General Orders No. 87, Adjutant-General's Office, series of 1873, is said to stand toward them in the light of a department commander. . . .

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

WINFIELD S. HANCOCK,

*Major-General U. S. Army, commanding Division of the Atlantic.*

Other weighty testimony remains to be heard, which must be deferred till the next number. In the mean time, those who are seeking fame by destroying or crippling our army will do well to withhold the fatal blow until they have disposed of the facts and reasonings of the letters already quoted.

JAMES A. GARFIELD.